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Abstract:
The article is an attem pt to analyze the relations betw een political 
trust and one o f the greatest problems o f the public domain: political corrup­
tion. It seems obvious that corrupt behaviors revealed in the public space are 
supposed to undermine citizens’ political trust. This thesis has been empirically 
verified many times. The author o f the paper presents the cause and effect model 
with institutional trust as the independent variable. The article is an attempt to 
analyze the possible directions o f its influence on political corrupt behaviors, 
assuming political trust to be the starting point, not the consequence, o f the 
“social disease” occurring in the public domain.
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Politics is a dynamic area. As observers o f political authorities’ actions, 
citizens usually do not have enough knowledge to be able to understand those 
behaviors fully. Often they do not have all the information on those behaviors 
either, because to a considerable extent the political sphere is available through 
the media and it is journalists who decide both which behaviors or events to 
show the viewers/citizens and how to interpret them. Furthermore, the growing 
speed o f content circulation often generates the phenomenon of content merging 
and blurring. The problem with comprehensive absorption o f information is 
also connected e.g. with the limited time a citizen has. Trust is a bridge between 
a citizen with a certain political entity, which makes it possible to avoid the above­
mentioned problems. It allows the person to actively participate in making impor­
tant psychological decisions without incurring great psychological cost connected 
with the need to systematically following political activities, thoroughly analyzing
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the information reaching the public domain, and devoting a considerable amount 
o f time to that. Trust reduces the complexity o f the reality by means o f convic­
tion that the social system is determined by mutual expectations concerning 
the future behavior o f the actors and encourages to choose specific options o f 
social activity. Thanks to that, the fundamental functions o f social interaction 
coordination and cooperation are achieved [Clegg, Hardy 1996], Even in 1979, 
Niklas Luhmann [1979] proved that trust is essential in the lives o f contemporary 
communities, since their complexity and lack o f transparency are growing, inten­
sifying the areas o f uncertainty and risk. From a more general perspective, when 
a citizen trusts certain areas on broadly understood politics, it gives the possi­
bility to focus the citizen’s attention on the elements o f the system which evoke 
the lack o f trust in them. Thus, it deepens more conscious political participation 
by ensuring complete knowledge and information, but also lowers the vigilance 
to actions occurring in the area o f trust.
The article is an attempt to analyze the relations between political trust 
and one o f the greatest problems o f the public domain: political corruption. 
Political corruption is a special form o f “social disease” -  special, because, first 
of all, it usually refers to entities (both politicians and institutions) that are trusted 
in the community. Secondly, these entities have received a credit of trust to influence 
the social order with their decisions, to take actions oriented at the benefit of the state 
or region and its citizens, which means that the consequences o f political corrup­
tion may be much broader than only individual. Thirdly, the actions o f these entities 
are observed by the public opinion, and each revelation of a corrupt act significantly 
affects the citizens’ consciousness concerning the transparency of the public domain, 
the approval for the actions o f political decision makers, or support for political 
institutions. According to Arnold J. Heidenheimer [1970], public opinion is a defi­
ning element for political corruption. The author stresses that the public opinion is 
flexible, it can embrace new problems not regulated by the existing law, as well as 
those that are regulated by the law but made obscure by the wrong attitudes.
Political corruption is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Although it 
is revealed at the individual level, it is determined by a number o f structural 
factors. The specificity o f political corruption determinants allows to identify 
their fundamental qualities. Firstly, they are common. This means that as long as 
corruption exists in the society and information on it reaches the public opinion, 
it w ill be a constant element o f  citizens’ awareness, which will be a factor 
promoting certain attitudes to the phenomenon. Secondly (and partly as a conse­
quence o f the first one), the determinants are entropic, which means they are 
contagious, grow larger and include more and more areas. And thirdly, they are 
interactive: groups o f determinants are not autonomous factors but interact with 
each other and usually intensify.
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It seems obvious that corrupt behaviors revealed in the public space are 
supposed to undermine citizens’ political trust. This thesis has been empirically 
verified many times. For example, Della Porta [2000] demonstrated that corrup­
tion lowered the trust in governm ents in Italy, Germany and France. Other 
studies have also proved that there is a significant relation between the level 
o f corruption in a state and the level o f citizens’ trust in the political system. 
Such studies have been carried out among others in Latin America [Seligson 
2002], East A sia [Chang, Chu 2006], A frica [LaVallee, R azafindrakoto, 
Roubaud 2008] or countries o f  E astern and W estern Europe [Anderson, 
Tverdova 2003], According to B. Guy Peters, we cannot expect the society 
to regard as legitimate the decisions taken in a political system they do not 
trust. In such situations citizens will always suspect that decisions in public 
matters are influenced by corrupt practices, that these decisions are associated 
w ith some deceptions or favoring some entities to the detrim ent o f  others 
[1999: 97], The author o f  the paper presents the cause and effect m odel 
with institutional trust as the independent variable. The article is an attempt 
to analyze the possible directions o f its influence on political corrupt beha­
viors, assuming political trust to be the starting point, not the consequence, 
o f the “social disease” occurring in the public domain.
Political trust
Political trust is usually  perceived as a m ulti-level concept [Levi, 
Stoker 2000], The structure o f political trust proposed by David Easton [1965] 
is considered as the classic one. He identifies trust for the w ider political 
system or regime and specific support for the politicians and parties that staff 
the system ’s institutions, and the structure has been an inspiration for many 
authors. Hence, political trust is commonly analyzed at a macro or micro level 
[Blind 2006], The object o f trust is the category used to divide between them. 
In the former case, also referred to as the organizational level, it is the political 
system and the institutions and organizations operating within it. Fluctuations 
o f trust in that area are connected with approving or rejecting the directions 
o f policy o f the institution, e.g. the government [Miller 1974], Institutional 
trust reduces the psychological and social costs o f implementing legal rules, 
carrying out po litical strategies, and in troducing reform s. A ccording to 
Marc J. Hetherington [2005], trust in the government in itself provides support 
for the government, sometimes more important than the ideology or political 
affiliation. The object o f the other category (micro level), also referred to as 
individual political trust, is particular persons functioning in the political sphere. 
Here, in turn, the level o f trust is regulated by behaviors o f certain political
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actors [Citrin 1974], It has been proved that trust in a politician is even more 
important in voters’ views than are qualities closely connected with the perfor­
mance o f the profession, such as leadership skills, party affiliation, ideology, 
or the domestic and foreign policy [Cwalina, Falkowski 2006: 559-560],
Another division o f political trust draws on the system o f different under­
lying motivations. Mark E. Warren [2006] refers to the first o f them as the first­
-order or encapsulated trust. This kind o f trust is associated with specific calcu­
lation: it is the result o f expecting the government or political leaders to behave 
in accordance with their partisan agenda. The other kind o f trust is psycholo­
gical or second-order political trust. It includes the evaluation o f moral values 
and attributes associated with the government, political institution, and political 
leaders. From the psychological perspective, the foundation o f trust is the search 
for and diagnosis o f sincerity in politicians’ personalities, their public talks and 
observed behaviors.
Despite these model divisions, we need to remember that the categories 
-  identified either on the basis o f the subject or the motivations -  are not auto­
nomous. They overlap and interact. For example, trust in individual politicians 
may the the source o f trust in the institutions or organizations they represent. 
Organizational trust more often develops from indirect experience, shared infor­
mation and observed actions of the representatives o f those institutions. This kind 
o f trust is generalized, yet its sources are often personal. In the other division, 
the identified motivations can also overlap in many ways. Trust based on psycho­
logical motivations is often the foundation o f trust based on rational motivations. 
The object o f calculation is not chosen randomly but rather can attract the citi­
zen’s attention by the psychological factors observed (e.g. during public talks).
The subject o f political trust is people (citizens, voters) who interact with 
each other all the time. Thus, many authors analyze the relations between poli­
tical and social trust, looking for many cause and effect connections between 
them. Robert E. Lane [1959: 164] is of the opinion that “trust in government offi­
cials may be a ‘specific instance o f trust in mankind”. Ronald Inglehart [1999] 
observes that democratic institutions foster social trust, ju st like trust fosters 
democracy. According to Bo Rothstein [2004: 7], a specific kind o f public insti­
tutions -  bodies maintaining the law and order -  more often create social capital 
than social capital influences the work o f political institutions. It is so because 
these institutions, due to direct contacts with citizens, are evaluated by them, 
and these evaluations translate into generalized trust in public domain entities 
which are not directly available for the citizens [see Rothstein, Stolle 2001; 
2001A], Then the so-called collective memory is created, connected with the 
functioning o f institutions [2000], Robert Putnam [2000] disagrees; according 
to him trust in another person is fundamental for trust in institutions. Seymour
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M. Lipset and W illiam Schneider [1983: 120] claim that “a general feeling 
o f confidence in institutions seems to derive from a personal outlook o f opti­
mism, satisfaction and trust”. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the rese­
arch by Luke Keele [2004], demonstrating that social capital has a significant 
influence on trust in the government and its political directions. Peri K. Blind
[2006] attempts to explain these relations, pointing out that face-to-face contact 
with members o f the community in societal associations allows people not only 
to get to know each other better in personal terms, but it also permits them 
to extend the positive feeling derived out o f this civic experience to strangers 
in the society and in the government. It is a well-known fact that citizens who 
are not involved in civic activities tend to view the government and its institu­
tions in more negative terms.
The role ofpolitical trust in preventing corrupt political behaviors
Approval for behaviors and designed directions o f  activity o f en ti­
ties in the public domain is an expression o f  political trust. It is an im por­
tant variable, which is quite often taken into consideration in studies aimed at 
identifying the determinants o f corruption. On the basis o f statistical analyses, 
Eric M. Uslaner [2002] concludes that trust explains the level o f corruption to 
a much greater degree than do the structural indices which describe the level of 
democracy, ownership rights, the degree o f decentralization or political stabi­
lity. Trust has a strong impact on corruption, while the opposite relation is much 
weaker. As a result, Ulsaner claims that lowering the level o f corruption in the 
society does not lead to an increase in social trust, but increasing the level o f 
trust is related to a drop of the corruption level.
In literature o f the subject there is a very clear trend in which the authors 
try to explain this relationship with references to social capital, which is natu­
rally associated with the level o f corruption. The direction o f these relation­
ships is based on the thesis that a high level o f social capital generally promotes 
a lower level o f corruption. Many common definitions o f social capital point 
out that trust is one o f its important dimensions. Pierre Bourdieu [1986: 250], 
proving the existence o f so-called individual social capital, defines it as a set of 
real and potential resources connected with having a permanent network of more 
or less institutionalized relations based on familiarity and mutual appreciation, 
or, in other words, with membership in a group, which provides each member 
support in the form o f capital possessed collectively by the group, the reliabi­
lity which gives them access to credit in the broadest meaning. Although the 
author does not mention trust directly, trust is actually the informal foundation 
o f these processes. James S. Coleman [1988] and Robert Putnam [1993] refer to
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trust as one o f the fundamental dimensions o f social capital. Francois Fukuyama 
[1997: 26] underscores that “social capital is a capability that arises from the 
prevalence o f trust in a society or in certain parts o f it.” Further, this author 
observes direct relations between trust and the system o f norms and values 
[1997: 38], A potential mechanism connecting corruption and social capital is 
a simple model which has the principal-agent-client structure well known from 
a number o f theoretical works in the corruption literature [e.g. Groenendijk 
1997; Pechlivanos 2002; Bjomskov 2003], It illustrates a mechanism where 
higher levels o f social capital lead to less corruption by both implying more 
agents that are unlikely to accept a bribe and fewer attempts at bribing agents.
The motivational role o f political trust in effective and reliable activity 
o f public domain entities is explained with the psychological contract theory. 
Psychological contract is an informal agreement between the parties, rather 
understood indirectly than directly. The contract can be universally defined 
as mutual beliefs based on bilateral expectations, obligations and promises. 
The beliefs determine the behaviors and attitudes of the parties to that contract. 
They influence the quality o f relationships between the parties: they can be 
a source o f misunderstandings (e.g. if  they are false) or o f long-term excellent 
cooperation. These beliefs are not formulated ad hoc. They are the product o f 
one’s experience, personal circumstances, or traits o f personality.
The concept o f psychological contract has been adapted from industrial 
and organizational psychology and has a broad application in empirical studies. 
However, the universal character o f its fundamental principles and similarity o f 
the structure o f organizational and political system make its assumptions appli­
cable in the field o f political science. In this context, the psychological contract 
may be considered from two perspectives. The broad perspective [Turska-Kawa 
2015] explains it as an informal agreement between the subjects o f democracy: 
citizens and authorities. Psychological contract is developed and modified by 
means o f interactions between a citizen and different links o f the socio-political 
system, but from the citizen’s point o f view it is made between him or her and 
the authority. This specific personification o f the state makes the contract conti­
nuous regardless o f the links occurring in the system. The contract usually refers 
to the perception o f what the state can offer an individual (certain democratic 
rights, the feeling that the main state institutions work on the basis o f demo­
cratic principles, the freedom o f speech, the sense o f security, honesty, wealth 
etc.) and what the individual can offer the state in return (participation in elec­
tions, participation in direct ways o f exercising power such as a referendum, 
membership in different organizations, interest in the political mechanisms etc.). 
In the narrower perspective, the parties to psychological contract are the poten­
tial voter on the one hand and the entity that is active on the political market
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and fights for votes in successive elections on the other hand. Each party to 
the contract contributes their experiences, expectations and promises. A visible 
expression o f the contract in this perspective is an election, which shows how 
strong the psychological contract is.
Apart from fair exchange and performing agreements, the level o f trust 
is the factor which reflects the condition o f psychological contract. The enti­
ties in the public domain usually receive information on the level o f political 
trust in themselves or the institutions they represent from the media or published 
social surveys. In the language o f psychological contract theory, for them it is 
a signal showing the condition of the contract made with the citizens. A strong 
contractjustified by the received social trust credit should generate the psycholog­
ical custom of reciprocally performing the entrusted public activities and strong 
engagement in the work. In that area, actions that are contrary to the partner’s 
expectations, such as corrupt political behaviors, should never occur, because if  
such a behavior is found, the psychological contract will obviously be broken. 
The essence of the contract is mutual exchange, which should be satisfying for 
both parties to the contract. It is important for the developing relationships that 
the psychological contract can never assume its ultimate form. Actually, it can be 
referred to as a dynamic process affected by the current activities o f the parties 
to it. Each failure to meet the formulated expectations, promises and obligations 
will lead to the violation or total breakup o f relationship, in many cases being 
strengthened for years. Thus, for public entities visible trust may be the motor o f 
reliable activities, as it proves a strong psychological contract. As argued by Della 
Porta [2000: 205] the “lack of confidence in government actually favors corrup­
tion insofar as it transforms citizens into clients and bribers who look for private 
protection to gain access to decision-makers”. This thesis is confirmed by research 
carried out by Matthew R. Cleary and Susan Stokes [2006], who argue that the 
lack o f trust in institutions fosters clientelism. Research by Manuel A. Guerrero 
and Arturo del Castillo [2003] also supports the thesis, as they prove that the 
decrease o f trust in the government, co-existing with the observed incidents o f 
corruption within certain institutions greatly reduces the risk o f detection and 
punishment and thus creates a disincentive to follow the written rules.
Many empirical studies show that effective economic and social systems 
have high levels o f culture o f trust. This culture means the feeling prevalent in 
the community that trust is a norm and the lack of trust is a pathology [Sztompka 
1997: 54], It is commonly believed that the level o f generalized trust is the 
measure o f the culture of trust. For instance the World Value Survey shows that 
the countries with the highest culture o f trust are Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
Denm ark, the N etherlands, Canada, the USA and G reat Britain, m eaning 
countries with a high level o f economic development and strong democratic
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institutions. The coexistence o f a low level o f corruption and high culture o f 
trust is also clear when we compare the results o f the latest edition o f European 
Social Survey and a ranking o f countries with regard to the level o f corruption 
published by Transparency International [Lewicka-Strzalecka 2006], The 2007 
Pew survey [Where Trust is h igh ...] found that in countries where people gene­
rally trust one another, there is also more confidence in the integrity o f political 
leaders. The percentage o f people rating corrupt political leaders as a very big 
problem tends to be lower in countries that have high levels o f trust such as 
Sweden, Canada, and Britain. On the other hand, in nations such as Nigeria and 
Lebanon, trust is rare and concerns about political corruption are widespread. 
There are some significant exceptions from this relation pattern. Kuwait is both 
a low trust and low corruption society. Indonesia is a high trust, high corruption 
country. Sweden is once again even less concerned about corruption than their 
high score on the trust measure would predict. These exceptions encourage to 
look for the determinants o f an opposite relation between trust and political 
corruption, in which trust can contribute to intensifying corrupt political beha­
viors, which is discussed further in the paper.
The role o f political trust in generating political corrupt behaviors
Trust and corruption seem to be opposite concepts [Uslaner 2002], Trust is 
based on accepting others and on openness. Transparency, in turn, is the enemy 
o f corruption, which tries to find any possible ways to prevent unethical behav­
iors from going public. Trust refers to what people have in common. Francis 
Fukuyama [1997: 38] treats trust as a mechanism based on the assumption that 
other members o f the community are honest and cooperative, and their behavior 
results from the shared values. Corruption is an expression o f egoism and only 
focusing on one’s own needs. Trust is often connected with possible sacrifices for 
others (voluntary work, altruistic help). Corruption involves the seizure o f some­
thing that actually belongs to others or is a common good. Trust and corruption 
are also based on opposing views of the human nature. Those who trust others 
perceive the world in a more optimistic way, believing that people are worth 
their trust, and do not regret taking that risk. According to a definition o f polit­
ical trust by Richard Fenno [1978: 55-56], i f  a voter trusts a member o f parlia­
ment, then he or she thinks: I  am ready to give in to you. I  know you can hurt me, 
though I  don’t know -when. But I  assume you will not hurt me and I  will not worry 
about your behavior. The view of human nature from the perspective of a person 
who resorts to corruption is completely different: oriented at personal profits and 
combating someone who -  in accordance with this opinion -  is not clever and 
cunning enough to be regarded as a partner.
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Despite the obvious opposing character o f the concepts, political trust 
can intensify corrupt political behaviors. As communities develop, diversify and 
the networks o f their interrelations become stronger, an individual faces a certain 
paradox. On the one hand, this diversity gives much more choice. But on the 
other hand, it makes it impossible to fully analyze each piece o f information and 
monitor its weak points [Otte 1999: 42-87], The sources of cognition that enable 
an individual to develop an optimum judgement and gain sufficient knowledge 
about all the elements o f the surrounding that can affect the individual’s life are 
limited. One mechanism to minimize those limitations is trust, which allows 
to make some unreflective choices based on belief in good intentions o f others 
(other people, groups or institutions). Besides, trust minimizes the variety and 
complexity o f the individual’s surroundings and its unpredictability in many 
aspects, which ensures greater sense o f security and allows to be sure o f closer 
or more distant relationships the individual has. This situation has a number of 
benefits both for an individual and for their social surroundings. But paradoxi­
cally it can also generate a specific kind o f consent to political crimes involving 
corruption, resulting from less attention devoted to the behaviors o f entities 
in the public domain, in which the individual trusts. Trust makes it possible to 
transfer the attention from the trusted entity to another one, if  the citizen feels 
he or she needs to be careful about that entity. Thus, trust can make a person 
insensitive to unacceptable signals coming from the object o f trust or effectively 
delay the moment they are noticed. This is a specific kind o f consent to poli­
tical entities violating moral and legal principles, resulting not from the attitude 
o f rational approval for such behaviors but from the callousness based on the 
mechanism o f political trust.
Paradoxically, one o f the mechanisms which explain the negative influ­
ence o f trust on the level o f political corruption may be social capital. Robert 
Putnam [2000] identifies two kinds o f social capital: bonding and bridging 
social capital. Whilst the former represents social capital which develops within 
inward looking and exclusive groups o f similar people or people who share 
similar interests; the latter consists o f social relations which are outward looking 
and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Political corruption is 
often fostered by bonding social capital since close social relations create high 
level o f trust and trustworthiness as well as in-group loyalty, which enforce 
specific reciprocity within the in-group, but not towards outsiders. Donna Harris
[2007] explains that bonding social capital can help foster corruption particu­
larly when enables the exclusion o f outsiders. Exclusiveness is essential in a 
corrupt network because of imperative need for concealment o f corrupt transac­
tions. This is because corruption is not only illegal, but it also violates the norm 
o f fairness which is likely to outrage those who do not belong to the ‘in-group’.
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Therefore, the members o f corrupt networks have to be cautious in deciding 
with whom they choose to associate. Consequently, access to a corrupt network 
tends to be limited only to those who have established long-term relationships 
with one another. This argument is closely related to ‘amoral familism’ [more 
in: Banfield 1958],
Political trust is the product o f certain calculation resulting in a citizen 
deciding to trust the political entity or specifying their level o f  trust in an 
institution. Obviously, trust itself includes a certain belief, though not clearly 
expressed. When someone trusts a person, he or she accepts the risk o f being 
hurt as a result o f  prospective or promised exchange o f broadly understood 
goods (values, support, material goods etc.). According to Annette Baier [1986: 
235]: When an individual relies on the free will o f  another person, he or she 
m ust rem ember that the free will is not limitless. In fact, trusting someone 
means that the individual can be hurt, but it also provides the possibility o f 
proving (to oneself) that the other person is reliable unless he or she abuses the 
benefit of the doubt. Constant suspicion and thinking about possibly getting hurt 
would mean that trust does not give the confidence and peace, not reduce the 
complexity o f the reality by means o f conviction that the social system is deter­
mined by mutual expectations concerning the future behavior o f the actors, but 
to the contrary, it would cause the citizen permanent doubt about the stability 
o f the mutual agreement. This would not suit the definition o f the phenomenon 
o f trust and undermine its role in the life o f the community. Therefore, people 
use a number o f defence mechanisms to eliminate negative feelings and protect 
their self-esteem. This process can be explained using the theory o f cognitive 
dissonance. Its m ain assumptions were proposed by Leon Festinger [1957] 
and demonstrate the process o f individuals rationalizing their own behavior. 
The mechanism occurs when a person has two contradictory cognitive elements 
(judgements, beliefs, ideas) which cause them anxiety and distress. The discom­
fort experienced by the person evokes motivational tension and initiates certain 
actions aimed at reducing it (e.g. by modifying one or more beliefs so as to 
make them more consistent, or introducing a new judgement). The sense o f 
internal stabilization requires logical coherence and affective balance, which is 
reflected in the strength directed at neutralizing the dissonance. Regarding the 
subject o f this paper, cognitive dissonance can be generated by a situation when 
an object o f political trust commits a political crime connected with corrup­
tion. Then a citizen experiences a contradiction: I  trust a person/institution that 
behaves in a way -which undermines my trust. The cognitive process may go 
two ways. The person may conclude that the object o f trust does not deserve 
that trust and develop distrust instead. But what is m uch more dangerous is 
the other way, negation, in accordance with the thesis that people do not like
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it when their decisions prove to be erroneous or fail to m eet their expecta­
tions. Thus, the individual activates a number o f defence mechanisms, aimed 
at maintaining the taken decision at any cost. One o f them is rationalizations 
(Lat ratio -  mind). They involve re-interpretation or revaluation o f the experi­
ence which is not fully consistent with the person’s decision, so that it becomes 
less burdensome. It means looking for rationaljustifications for one’s decisions 
and attitudes afterwards, whose goal is to prevent the lowering o f the individ­
ual’s self-esteem. If  the political trust a citizen has in a certain entity (whether 
at the macro or micro level) is upset by learning o f a political crime involving 
corruption, initiating the rationalization mechanism will be oriented at looking 
for evidence to protect the citizen’s decision, at the same time justifying the 
corrupt act. For instance, the citizen may blame persons who are not the object 
o f trust but share the responsibility for the incident. Or the citizen may negate 
the guilt o f the entity, trying to convince him self or herself that corruption is 
common in the public domain and the object o f trust has committed itju st once.
Conclusion
The above discussion shows that it is hard to clearly outline the conse­
quences o f political trust for corrupt political behaviors. The paper shows the 
areas in which it is both a variable that blocks the spreading of unethical behav­
iors in the public domain and a variable that can play a significant role in their 
prolification. The determination o f clear directions o f the relations is difficult 
because both political corruption and political trust are complex phenomena, 
in which the authors can see a multi-level structure.
What is important, political trust is a dimensional variable, which means 
that the person (or, i f  we analyze aggregated indices, the whole community) 
represents a certain level o f political trust as a point on a continuum whose 
extremes are zero and maximum values. Political corruption, in turn, is a zero­
-one phenomenon, which in geographical analysis is usually shown from the 
perspective o f the number o f (identified) cases. Thus, the analysis o f influence 
o f different levels o f political trust in political corruption seems to be an inte­
resting and open topic, as due to different, sometimes contradictory directions 
o f that influence, the differences in that regard may be considerable. Creating 
the theoretical model on the basis o f the presented discussion, the author makes 
an attempt to present a chart o f correlations between the analyzed variables, 
emphasizing that it is only a model, which opens the way for further research, 
especially empirical research.
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Figure 1. Relations between the level o f political trust and political corruption
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Source: author’s own study.
The relations between political trust and political corruption seem to be 
U-shaped (Figure 1). This means that both very low and very high political trust 
can generate a higher number o f political crimes involving corruption. The hrst 
extreme presents the classic relation expressed in the psychological contract 
theory. The lack o f trust reflecting the state o f psychological contract shows that 
it does not exist. In this case there are no external1 mechanisms blocking corrupt 
behaviors, even those resulting from the desire to meet the informal rules o f 
psychological contract. The other one emphasizes the role o f too high political 
trust, causing cognitive callousness and difficulties in coding behaviors that 
undermine that trust. The medium level o f political trust coexists with the lower 
level o f political corruption. It results from a specific cognitive sensitivity o f the 
citizen observing the political scene, which serves a sentinel role and sensitizes 
the individual to behaviors that do not much their civic expectations.
1 It differs in this regard from the internal ones, resulting among others from internalized 
norms or the appropriate stage of moral development [see the report].
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Apart from the above-mentioned factors which make empirical verifica­
tion o f relations between political trust and political corruption difficult, such as 
(1) internal complexity o f the concepts, and (2) their functioning on different 
measurement scales, it needs to be emphasized that (3) trust is a declarative 
variable, whose self-diagnosis may be the result o f different social interactions, 
and (4) corruption is a variable which by nature can never be reflected in the 
constructed diagnostic indices. Thus, these are variables that are very difficult 
to present in a clear methodological framework, which means that each such 
attempt is a valuable contribution to the discussion on the subject.
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